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From: JONES Siân

Sent: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 08:48:05 +0100**From:** JONES, Siân**To:** Westminster Interested Persons

Cc: 'Jonathan Hough QC'; 'Aaron Moss'; SMITH Matthew; DAVIS Natasha

Subject: Westminster Bride Inquests: response to Note dated 26 September 2018

Importance: Normal

Dear All,

We are writing in answer to a Note (dated 26 September) provided by the representatives of the siblings and parents of PC Keith Palmer ("the Note"), to provide the response of the Inquests team. In summary, that Note asks the Coroner to undertake a series of further enquiries into the topic of security arrangements at the Palace of Westminster ("PoW"). Although the Note refers to requests for "disclosure", most of the requests are not for material in the Coroner's hands (to which the disclosure provisions of the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 may apply). They are requests for the Coroner to make further enquiries and seek material from others, primarily from the Metropolitan Police Service ("MPS").

As all Interested Persons will be aware, the subject of security arrangements at the PoW has been extensively investigated in these inquests. While the topic is within the scope of the inquests, an exercise of judgment is always required as to how far a coronial investigation is pursued (as reiterated by the Court of Appeal yesterday in *Coroner for the Birmingham Inquests (1974) v Hambleton* [2018] EWCA Civ 2081 at [46]-[57]). For example, while the inquest is concerned to establish the security arrangements in New Palace Yard as they stood in March 2017, it is not an inquiry into security practices across the PoW going back many years. It is not an inquiry into DPS investigations, or into the Operation Classific investigation. Overall, it is an inquiry to establish the facts of how PC Palmer died in a rigorous but proportionate way.

The topic of security arrangements at New Palace Yard was the subject of substantial enquiries before the hearing began. The Inquests team did a huge amount of work with the MPS to ensure that relevant material was disclosed in a manner which did not compromise present and future security. This produced the statements of Commander Usher and their exhibits; detailed statements from the AFOs stationed in New Palace Yard at the time of the attack; and the plans and video compilations of DC Overall.

Against that background, we respond as follows to the requests made in the Note:

1. DPS Working Papers re PCs Ashby and Sanders: A request has been made for any working papers of the DPS in the review concerning these officers. The MM1 report of the review has been provided and interested persons have been able to question both PCs Ashby and Sanders and Commander Usher (who instigated the review). We do not consider that making further enquiries to unearth working papers is appropriate. What matters is the substance of the review report.
2. Post Instructions / Tactical Reviews: Interested Persons have been provided with a full set of the Post Instructions from the time of the attack and a full set of the previous version. For context, they have also been provided with a schedule giving the relevant part of previous Post Instructions going back to 2010. They have been provided with relevant parts of the last two Tactical Assessments. Paragraph 7 of the Note argues that historic arrangements must be explored to determine the adequacy of systems going back over the years. We disagree. As noted above, this is not an inquiry into the general adequacy of PoW security arrangements (over many years). The Note also asks for further parts of Tactical Assessments addressing parts of the Estate other than New Palace Yard. We would resist that request for the same reason that this is not a general inquiry into PoW security.
3. Records of Checks by Supervisors: At the Coroner's request, the MPS made searches to determine whether there were records of Inspectors / Sergeants checking compliance by AFOs with Post Notes at relevant times. They initially believed (for good reason) that none existed, because there was nothing on any central system. During Commander Usher's evidence, it became apparent that one Inspector in 2015/16 (Inspector Munns) had made his own records. We immediately arranged for a further statement to be taken from Commander Usher exhibiting those records, and for enquiries to be made as to whether other similar records were kept by Inspector Munns' successors. Those enquiries have revealed that other similar records were not kept at later stages. However, we went further and took a statement from Inspector Rose who was in post after Inspector Munns.
4. Records of Briefings: The Note requests records of briefings given to AFOs. We have been informed by the MPS that no such material exists, and none of the witnesses has suggested that there were relevant briefing documents.
5. Checks of ADAM after March 2017: We are not persuaded that it is relevant to make enquiries to check on officers' logging into the ADAM system after March 2017. This is not relevant to the arrangements as they stood in March 2017.
6. Training Material: Commander Usher's statements give details of exercises at the PoW and what was learned from them, gisting the relevant information without infringing security sensitivities. Nobody has suggested that AFOs stationed in New Palace Yard were trained specifically on where to position themselves in the event of an attack such as that by Khalid Masood. In any event, that is a question which could have been put to the AFOs and can be put to Ch Supt Morris.

We hope that this helps to explain our approach.

Kind regards

Siân

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